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Abstract
The persistence of disparities is one of the most striking features of regional
development. We argue that movements of labour force, instead of being an
always equilibrating mechanism, can also make persistent or even reinforce
such inequalities. The most advanced regions are in fact generally more at-
tractive, in terms of opportunities, especially to more qualiﬁed workers, who,
in turn, are an essential ingredient of regional development and competitive-
ness because of the human capital they bear.
We set up a two-regional framework, with a continuum of diﬀerent skill-type
individuals. Each agent’s utility function depends on the wage she earns
through her skills, leaving the process of human capital formation out of this
paper. Within this framework, we identify and model two complementary
mechanisms for skill biased migration ﬂows to take place.
The ﬁrst one resides in the way wages are set. If, in fact, the most skilled
workers are not paid their productivity because of wage compression, they
will have an incentive to move towards regions with a more dispersed wage
scheme. The second mechanism dwells in the existence of some regional spe-
ciﬁc immobile assets, which make workers diﬀerently productive in diﬀerent
regions; this happens to a larger extent for those endowed with highest skills,
which will therefore be more likely to overcome the mobility costs.
Hence a Kaldor-type cumulative process bearing persistent regional dispari-
ties is set up.1 Introduction
Policy makers have started to pay increasing attention to the importance
of human capital as a primary source of economic development given some
consolidated theoretical insights (Lucas, 1988, Romer, 1986). At a regional
level, the role of human capital stock as a pre-condition for regional growth
and competitiveness has been emphasised in many studies (Camagni, 1995,
Malecki, 1999, De la Fuente and Ciccone, 2002). Besides, the prospective EU
eastward enlargement, the ongoing European integration process and their
consequences in terms of factor mobility, rise the question of regional dis-
parities and their determinants, in particular the interplay between national
convergence and regional inequalities (Boldrin and Canova, 2001, Martin,
1998). Under a normative point of view, policy makers have stressed the im-
portance of education and training policies. At the same time, an important
driver of regional integration has being identiﬁed in factor mobility, in par-
ticular labour. Attention is here paid to the skill composition of migration
ﬂows, which can lead to regional redistribution of human capital. In order to
understand this process, three crucial questions should be addressed:
1. what are the eﬀects of educational attainment1 on the likelihood of
migrating?
2. How is the geographical distribution of human capital aﬀected by these
skill biased migration ﬂows?
3. How does this disparity aﬀects economic performances and in particular
the persistence of regional inequalities?
Within a classical paradigm, it is a general ﬁnding that alignments in wage
diﬀerentials can be achieved through inter-regional migration acting as an
1In the reminder of this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we decide not to distinguish
among education, training and other forms of human capital formation, and in particular
no metric for skills is explicitly provided. Though a crucial point in understanding the
returns to scholarly lies in their eﬀectiveness in terms of abilities, in this paper wages are
generally proportional to skills which in turn are either acquired through education or
constitute an endogenous individual feature. The education process is not explicitly taken
into account, since this is not the focus of this paper.
4adjustment mechanism and can thus be conceived as a policy tool for coun-
terbalancing regional disparities (Blanchard et al., 1992). We hereby contro-
vert this issue and ask whether migration ﬂows play a role in the persistence
of regional disparities. How can the capital endowment aﬀect the potential
attractiveness of regions? Although net migration from poorer to richer re-
gion can be expected to help towards the narrowing of regional disparities
(Bentivogli and Pagano, 1999), the evidence is that the role of migration in
adjusting labour markets is very sluggish.
Moreover, labour ﬂows bear movers’ human capital, so that the regional
capital endowment can be aﬀected by labour ﬂows (Ritsila and Ovaskainen,
2001). This capital inﬂows increase production in the receiving region, show-
ing an upward shift in production (Dolado et al., 1994). Labour ﬂows may
be seen as the way regions respond to wage diﬀerentials. Diﬀerent implica-
tions are possible: migration ﬂows can be either an adjustment mechanism
towards equilibrium (see ﬁgure 1) or a boost for positive cumulative eﬀects in
the receiving region (see ﬁgure 2); the net eﬀect will depend on the skill con-
tent embedded in outward labour ﬂows and diﬀerent implications are shown
in the reminder of this paper. The way regional ﬁxed endowment can aﬀect
regional welfare is analysed in section 4, where the interplay between skills
and capital is the main driver for regional disparities to persist.
2 The Importance of Human Capital
In the 20th century, a new paradigm of production raised, characterised by a
sharp shift from the relevance of physical elements to the relational dimension
of the structure and the dynamics of the economic system (Castells, 2000).
Those relational aspects here discussed constitute important ingredients of
regional development (CERTeT-Bocconi, 2002). It is currently recognised
that disparity in productivity and growth has far less to do with the abun-
dance of natural resources and more and more with the ability to improve
the quality of human capital and factors of production, to create new knowl-
edge and ideas and incorporate them in equipments and people (David and
Foray, 2002); these features deﬁne the ’knowledge society’. This perspective
stresses the fact that the most valuable assets are intangible investments
(human and social capital) and that knowledge and creativity are key factor.
5The rise of the Knowledge Economy lies in the observation that ’knowledge’,
’skills’ or ’information’ based activities are playing an increasingly signif-
icant role in economic growth. Capital, labour, and natural resources are
essential ingredients for ﬁrms, but, lately, economists have come to recog-
nise the role of technology, as well as information, innovation, and creativity,
in expanding economic potential. Human capital is widely acknowledged as
one of the main economic growth engines; besides, large diﬀerences exist
within/between countries in terms of both quantity and quality of educa-
tional structure and institutions (Wossmann, 2002)2. That has resulted in
a relevant number of people ﬂowing within countries and between countries
(and within and between regions) in order to get a better qualiﬁcation. More
analysis should be devoted to identifying a way of detecting such a process
with special reference to its eﬀect in terms of the ’brain drain’ and ’skim-
ming’ process which may foster further existing regional disparities through
a positive feed-back circuit which originates a virtual circle in the ’richest’ re-
gion (better educational institution - attraction of the most talented workers
- higher growth - larger investment in education - better educational institu-
tion) at the expense of the ’poorest’ regions (Wood and Ridao-Cano, 2002).
A related though distinct issue concerns the existence of diﬀerent regional
structures, reﬂecting in interregional wage diﬀerentials. This diﬀerence can
be seen as a boost for labour migration. McCann (2001) suggests the follow-
ing frameworks to explain how workers can respond to such regional wage
diﬀerentials:
Equilibrium Model The term ’equilibrium’ refers to the Walrasian equi-
librium. Thus the implications rely on the hypotheses of agents ra-
tionality, information completeness and price-taking behaviour. This
model is somehow na¨ ıf, since unemployment is not observed because it
occurs out of equilibrium; nevertheless important hints to understand
adjustment forces towards equilibrium are provided.
Disequilibrium Model The disequilibrium model of inter-regional labour
migration aims at providing some explanation about unemployment,
without giving up to a notion of ’equilibrium’, though not a Walrasian
2Which are the main, but not the only drivers for human capital formation and accu-
mulation.
6one. The main implication is that the clearing market condition will
not hold anymore, even if all markets but one are cleared.
Endogenous Human Capital Model The endogenous human capital model
of migration considers that movers bear with them ’human capital’ and
then hosts’ capital endowments are aﬀected. In particular, if for some
reasons movers are relatively more skilled, the host region will expand
its production by a net increase in capital, so widening — instead of re-
ducing3 — the interregional gap. This framework oﬀers useful insights
about forces that can counterbalance adjustment mechanisms and set
cumulative eﬀects.
In the present paper, the arguments supporting the micromotives for workers
to move in response to regional wage diﬀerentials, are based on the ﬁrst and
the third explanation: a skill bias of migration ﬂows (endogenous human
capital model) can account for a cumulative growth process; the argument
behind the equilibrium model, instead, prevents cumulative eﬀects to prevail
over adjustment mechanisms. In practice, both forces work and the relative
size of skills borne in movers determine the net eﬀect on host and sending
regions.
Suppose that a two regions (West and East) setting holds and that for
some reason the West is experiencing higher wages. The disequilibrium borne
in the wage diﬀerential ww ¡ we (see ﬁg. 1) will increase the probability for
workers to move to the West. On the basis of the considerations hereby
outlined, West-ward migration ﬂows are more likely to concern high skilled
labour force, which is more sensitive to wage diﬀerentials and can more easily
overcome moving costs. As a result, the labour supply will expand in the
West and shrink in the East; besides, the marginal productivity of labour
and hence the Western wage rate will fall4.
In-migration ﬂows should imply an increase in the capital stock in the host
country and hence a shift in its production function. Such an explanation can
by provided by the endogenous human capital model. It is hence relevant,
for the purposes hereby pursued, to focus on the skill bias migration ﬂows
3In the reminder of the paper the mechanism will be shown in detail.




7forecasted within such model.
If the following hypotheses hold:
² individuals maximise their expected wage according to the human cap-
ital they are bearing (Becker, 1975);
² individuals adopt a search strategy and are willing to accept a job
only when the match with labour demand allows them to earn their
reservation wage (Tedeschi, 1992).
Then, the reservation wages tending to increase for individuals with higher
human capital and the job search period being likely to be longer for high-
skill workers, under a spatial perspective this will result in highly skilled
workers being characterised by a higher propensity to move (Ritsila and
Ovaskainen, 2001). Their returns to human capital will so be maximised.
Higher propensity to move for higher human capital individuals will make
more complex the conclusions of the equilibrium model, where it acts as a
pure adjustment mechanism, trigging a cumulative process in the host region,
mainly by a capital increase in its production function.
If outward ﬂows are highly skill biased, the cumulative eﬀects are more likely
to prevail. Now, one reason for migration ﬂows to be skill biased lies in the
existence of wage diﬀerentials, due to external economies working in the most
advanced region, which make productivity higher. Later, this will be related
to heterogeneities in regional production structures (see section 4).
3 Skill Biased Migration Flows
The core of the paper presents a model with two features focusing on two
complementary explanations for the selectivity of migration ﬂows: ﬁrst we
will show that wage dispersion/concentration has diﬀerent eﬀects on the mi-
gration choices of diﬀerently endowed individuals; then we will illustrate how
the existence of some region speciﬁc and unevenly distributed factors can be
one additional cause of skill selective migration ﬂows.
We have argued that wage diﬀerentials are an important driver for the
attraction of high skilled workers. In fact, if high skilled workers cannot re-
ceive as much as their productivity, then they might decide to aﬀord some
mobility costs and move to other regions where their salary is higher. Why
8Figure 1: Labour migration: the equilibrium model.






Figure 3: Wage function: expected versus real productivity.
should workers receive less or more than their productivity? The basic answer
hinges in the information asymmetries between ﬁrms and workers, such that
ﬁrms set wages (w) equal to workers expected productivity (E(MP)). Under
regularity conditions, the concavity of the wage function ensures that the
wage equation is as depicted in ﬁg. 3. In this situation, under perfect infor-
mation, ﬁrms would pay according to the concave curve. In reality, ﬁrms can
assess workers’ productivity on average, whereas it is hardly done on each in-
dividuals’ productivity. Then, ﬁrms set a simpliﬁed wage scheme, such that
workers are paid proportionally to their productivity and such that wages
equal (on average) the marginal productivity, but individual marginal pro-
ductivities can diﬀer from individual wages. This is represented through the
straight line in the same ﬁgure.
Hence, if the worker exactly knows her productivity and the ﬁrm is only
able to assign her to a productivity range, each worker is paid the average
productivity of the group she is assigned to.
As a basic case of skill biased migration ﬂows, compare a region (West)
with a pure market economy, in which each worker receives her productivity
as a wage, to a region (East) in which the salary will be the same for all












Figure 4: Regional migration ﬂows: pure market wages and ﬂat wages.
to be identical in any other feature, in particular we are not assuming that
the total payroll is diﬀerent across regions, nor that regions are diﬀerently
capital or labour endowed. In particular, assume that the skill distribution
function of workers is the same in both regions, and, for simplicity, that
individual skills sj are uniformly distributed in the interval [0,P].
The wage for workers in the West will be equal to their productivity,
i.e. ww(sj) = ¼(sj); workers in the other region (East) will instead get their
average productivity we(sj) = E(¼(sj)). If this is the case, any worker with
productivity higher than the average, will have an incentive to move from
the East to the West, whereas those with productivity less than the average
will have an incentive to move from the West to the East. If some ﬁxed sunk
mobility costs C are taken into account (see ﬁg. 4), not all the workers will get
a net beneﬁt if they decide to move, but only those who are able to overcome
mobility costs, i.e. those for which ww(sj) ¡ we(sj) = ¼(sj) ¡ E(¼sj) > C
will move from the East to the West and those for which we(sj) ¡ ww(sj) =
E(¼sj)¡¼(sj) > C will move from the East to the West. Thus, human capital
tend to increase in the West at detriment of the East.
With more complex wage settings, for example because there exist wage
layers in each region (but diﬀerent across regions), composite results may rise.





































Figure 5: Regional migration ﬂows: two wage levels in the East versus four in the
West.
12just two possible wage layers, one for the high productivity workers and one
for the low ones, giving workers a salary proportional to the group average;
assume that the other region (the West) decides for a more dispersed wage
setting, so that four possible wage layers exist, with a similar mechanism.
Without loss of generality, we assume that in both regions the distribution
of skills across workers is uniformly distributed in the interval from 0 to P
(where P represents the productivity of the most productive worker): the
salary in the East will be equal to P=4 for the workers whose productivity
is below P=2 and up to 3=4P for those workers whose productivity is larger
than P=2; in the West the salary will be:
² ww
L = P=8 for the workers with ¼(sj) · P=4
² ww
LM = 3=8P for the workers with P=4 < ¼(sj) · P=2
² ww
MH = 5=8P for the workers with P=2 < ¼(sj) · 3P=4
² ww
H = 7=8P for the workers with ¼(sj) > 3P=4
In this case (Fig. 5) workers in the West with 0 · ¼(sj) < P=4 or 1=2 ·
¼(sj) < 3P=4, will have an incentive to move to the East; at the same
time workers in the East with P=4 · ¼(sj) < P=2 or 3P=4 · ¼(sj) < P
will have a beneﬁt if they decide to move to the West. These results show
that, even if not all the westwards migrants are more productive than the
eastwards migrants, this is true on average, and that the most skilled workers
still have an incentive to move to the region whose structure of salaries is
more dispersed. This result also holds if sunk mobility costs are introduced,
provided that this cost is below the ceiling of P=8; above this level, in fact,
given the wage structure supposed, the cost of mobility is so high that nobody
can get a net beneﬁt from moving.
The magnitude and structure of mobility costs, however, can aﬀect these
results. We can show this with another example: assume that the East has
now three equally spaced wage layers instead of two and that the wage struc-
ture of the West remains identical as in the previous example (Fig. 6). The
wage structure of the East is therefore now as this:
² we
L = P=6 for workers with ¼(sj) < P=3
² we




































































Figure 6: Regional migration ﬂows: three wage levels (East) versus four (West).
14² we
H = 5P=6 for workers with ¼(sj) ¸ 2P=3
In this case, without migration costs, there are three intervals of productivity
[P=4;P=3);[P=2;2P=3);[3=4P;1] in which workers in the East decide to move
to the West and three intervals [0;P=4);[P=3;P=2);[2P=3;3P=4) for which
workers in the West decide to move to the East, with brain gain for the
West as a result. However, these results are sensitive to the mobility costs
and to the way mobility costs are modelled; for instance, for migration costs
above P=24, there will no longer be brain drain (the most productive workers
will not move) and, for C > P=8 the migrants from the region with more
dispersed wages (West) will be, on average, more skilled than the migrants
from the region with more concentrated wages (East), a result which partially
contradicts the one obtained with no mobility costs. For very high mobility
costs (above P=3) migration will not take place any more.
Nevertheless, apart these special cases, the framework here outlined is
consistent with a quite general ﬁnding that highly skilled workers are more
likely to move (Coppel et al., 2001, Davis and Weinstein, 2002, Guellec and
Cervantes, 2001, Salt, 1997, Shields and Shields, 1989, Maurel and Sedillot,
1999). Moreover, in the majority of the cases, labour mobility beneﬁts the
region with a more dispersed wage scheme because high skilled workers can
get as much as possible (the maximum being their marginal productivity).
4 Regional Endowment Attractiveness
In the previous section, we focused on the capability of workers to get a part
of their own marginal productivity as a wage. We now turn to explain skill
biased migration ﬂows in the case each worker receives her own productiv-
ity. In particular, diﬀerences in labour productivity are now due to regional
speciﬁc immobile assets, stemming an incentive to move which is increasing
in workers’ skills.
The recent literature has focused on the relation between personal/regional
characteristics and migratory behaviour (for example Borjas (1994)); the gen-
eral inference concerns the selectivity of migration processes under personal,
regional and industrial characteristics (Beine et al., 2003). There exists a
number of economic, social and psychological factors that contribute to or
15prevent the decision to move. Personal and family traits, as well as the char-
acteristics of the origin and destination regions, shape the outcome of in-
dividual decisions to migrate or stay (Venturini, 2001). Ultimately, positive
migration decisions at the individual level aggregate into considerable pop-
ulation ﬂows and signiﬁcant changes in the regional stock of human capital
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). From the standpoint of regional human cap-
ital reallocation, the eﬀect of educational attainment (as a proxy of skills) on
migratory behaviour is of special interest. A common result is that a higher
level of education increases individual’s migration likelihood (Molho, 1987).
We hereby stress the role that skills play; at the same time, we decided to
take aside all personal motivations that can aﬀect a decision to move.
Suppose the same two region (i = 1;2) setting discussed above hold.





where Yi is the total production for region i, Ki is the regional endowment





where sj deﬁnes the individual skills for any worker j. We assume that the
production of a region is a function of the total skills (Si) borne in the workers
of region (ni).
The deﬁnition of regional endowment is here broad and encompasses all
immobile production factors coming from technological, ﬁnancial and institu-
tional constraints: this can include physical infrastructure, past investments
in physical capital, patents, regional institutional traits, regional best prac-
tices and established routines. Only for the sake of simplicity, in the rest
of the paper the regional ﬁxed endowment will be sometimes referred to as
’capital’.
Both regions are assumed to experience a perfectly competitive framework
in which workers are paid their marginal productivity for each skill unit held.




Si )1¡®, the individual wage for worker j,






16Skills being territorially equally distributed, the relative wage of two workers








Hence, for any individual skill endowment, the inter-regional wage ratio de-
pends on the interregional capital to skills ratio. As a consequence, the mon-
etary net beneﬁts (B) for a worker deciding to move from one region to the
other is proportional to her skills and again dependent on the capital to skills
ratio of the two regions5:









Graph 7 depicts wages as a function of skills in both regions, before workers
actually move. In particular, it is evident that the same individual j endowed
with s skills, receives wjw(sj) if she stays in the West and wje(sj) if she stays
in the East. After migration ﬂows have taken place, wages as a function
of skills will be equalised across regions somewhere between the two lines.
The adjustment mechanism at the basis of this equalisation process will be
tackled in detail in section 5. Within this framework, we can allow for spatial
skills depreciation. In fact, not all individual skills are transferrable, due to
regional diﬀerences6. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to notice that this point
is empirically less important for high-skill workers, whose capabilities can be
more easily transferred (Borjas, 1994). In particular, if only a ﬁxed fraction
(1 ¡ t) of individual skills are transferrable with worker j, net monetary
beneﬁts will reduce from eq. 5 to:









The more similar the regions, the lower the share of non transferrable skills,
i.e. the lower t. As a consequence, the loss from moving will be negatively
(positively) related to interregional contiguities (dissimilarities)7.
5Notice that eq. 4 (West to East wage ratio) already represents the monetary net
beneﬁts from moving, with logarithm terms.
6There are usually environment/milieux diﬀerences, local production systems require
to some extent region speciﬁc skills and, in case of international migration, cultural and
language diﬀerences.
7We hereby mean territorial proximity not simply in terms of spatial closeness but




Figure 7: Individual skills and their returns in case of movement.
Assume now that any mover bears a cost. In particular, for the whole
population, this cost will be distributed as a function Φ with average ¹ and
variance ¾2. We also assume that this cost is independent on the region and
on skills, so that for any sj, the distribution of the mobility cost of any sub-
sample of individuals endowed with sj is the same if the parameters are not
diﬀerent. It is reasonable to think that ¹ is positive, since on average individ-
uals are likely to incur in a positive cost when moving, but it is not necessary
to assume this cost to be lower bounded (for example at 0), since the cost is
also due to personal characteristics, so that there may exist individuals for
which the personal beneﬁt of moving exceeds costs even when wage increases
are not taken into account, for example for personal ties and other amenities
which are otherwise neglected. Consistently with the three models deﬁned in
section 2, individuals move if B > C with C » Φ(¹;¾2), and this allows to
draw a function which, for any value of the skills sj (assume sj ¸ 0) gives the
correspondent share of people willing to move. We deﬁne this function M,
since it represents the propensity to move as a function of individual skills.
Let us work out the case in which Kw
Sw > Ke
Se . In the special case of no
individual costs variance (i.e. ¾2 = 0 and Φ collapses to a constant value),
the function M for individuals living in the East will be stepwise (ﬁg. 8)
and C = ¹, B > C are both veriﬁed for only individuals living in the East




Figure 8: M function with homogeneous mobility preferences.
West. For people living in the east, the condition of indiﬀerence in the case






Sw )1¡® ¡ (Ke
Se )1¡®]
. (7)
Notice that Sw and Se being the sum of individual skills within each region,
s¤ is actually endogenous. If the migration ﬂows are conceptually thought as a
stepwise process this problem is ruled out. Suppose that ﬁrst, workers decide
whether they would move or not, but they cannot do it at this early stage.
Second, only one of them can actually do it. This movement is enough to
change the incentive system to move and workers assess their new indiﬀerence
condition (again expressed in equation 7). For every worker moving, all the
others evaluate their incentive to move. This mechanism continues until the
incentive to move vanishes for everybody. In the end, only a proportion of
people initially willing to move will actually do it, and this share is enough
to bring inter-regional equilibrium.
When we allow for individual heterogeneity, the function M for individ-
uals living in the East will be a curve with shape similar to a logistic, as the
one in ﬁg. 9, upper bounded at M = 1 (the maximum share of population
that can move). The higher ¹, the lower the intercept A; the higher ¾2, the





Figure 9: M function with heterogeneous mobility preferences.
(but notice that in this case the height of point A is not aﬀected). When the
ratio Kw
Sw is equal to Ke
Se , for example after that a migration ﬂow of suﬃcient
width has taken place, and it has worked as an adjustment, the function
M becomes ﬂat; this occurs because the beneﬁt B will be nil for everyone
and, therefore, only the fraction of people with negative moving costs will be
willing to move.
5 Adjustment to the Equilibrium
As in section 3, the adjustment to the equilibrium can reinforce regional
diﬀerences of per capita income, though wages are equalised for workers with
the same skill content (the ratio expressed in eq. 4 tends to 1).
In order to show that, let us deﬁne nw and ne the populations living in
the two regions (i = E;W). Before the adjustment has taken place, the






ni . If the workers of the two regions
are initially identically endowed of human capital, then Sw
nw = Se
ne and, as a
consequence, the ratio between the two incomes per capita will depend on









20Once we introduce the movement of people, the equilibrium with skill selec-





the capital to labour ratio); when the two ratios are equal, in fact, any single
unit of skills in the two regions will be paid the same, therefore neutralising
the monetary incentive to move for all workers. Notice, however, that these
two ratios become identical only when skills depreciation (t) is 0.
Due to the mechanics described above, in particular the structure of the
M function, the more skilled a worker, the higher the incentive to move from
the poorer to the richer region. For this reason, the skills needed for the
adjustment of the capital to skills ratio, will be embedded in relatively few
migrants, whose skills will be higher than the average population, that is
sm > Sw
nw = Se
ne. If, again, the West is the region more endowed with capital,
this ﬂow of skilled people will move mainly from the East to the West, and
only a smaller group (with average productivity below Sw
nw) will move to the
East. At the end of the process not only nw
¤ > nw, ne
¤ < ne but, since movers






ne¤, that is the average capability
of workers in the West will be higher than in the East.
Assume for simplicity that no skill depreciation will take place (t = 0),
and remember that K represents an immobile factor. In equilibrium the ratio














We call this result agglomeration, since the total output is now more concen-
trated than before in the richer region.
Let us now analyse the eﬀects that labour mobility brings on income per
























¤ , the ratio of eq. 10 can be decom-


































21We observe that, allowing for migration, income disparities can fade out, but












Thus, the adjustment process induced by labour migration can be decom-
posed in two counteracting eﬀects:
Push force The migration of people and skills towards the region more
endowed of capital. This equalises the productivity of each skill unit
and, consequently, the wage earned by workers endowed with the same
amount of skills. This force narrows income disparities (increase in nw,
decrease in ne).
Pull force The existence of selective migration ﬂows, with the consequent
increase of the average skills of workers living in the already richer
region. This force widens income disparities (increase in Sw, decrease
in Se).
Migration ﬂows increase income disparities when the second eﬀect overcomes
the ﬁrst one. This happens when eq. 12 is veriﬁed. The condition becomes















This means that diﬀerences in income per capita increase if the relative in-
crease of population is lower than the initial capital per capita ratio; in this
case, the migration of workers is highly biased towards the upper skill seg-
ment, and the right hand side of eq. 13 is closer to 1 than the left hand side.
This result implies that not only the economy is more agglomerated after the
migration adjustment, but also that there are wider diﬀerences in income. It
could be argued that these diﬀerences are not completely unfair, since they
partly reﬂect a diﬀerent skill endowment of the workers, but an important
criticism to leave this happen resides in the concentration of most skilled
people along with the most eﬃcient means of production in one place at
detriment of the other region.






















Equilibrium models (Barro 
et al., 2003; Blanchard 
and Katz, 1992) and Brain 
Gain























Skill biased migration 











































Figure 10: Localisation and labour mobility: typology of models.
The mobility of workers, in presence of strong skill biased migration ﬂows,
gives very diﬀerent results from those previewed by traditional models and
also from those of most new economic geography models. These insights are
summarised in table 10. If in a classical framework (Blanchard et al., 1992),
decreasing the mobility costs for workers makes regions more similar in terms
of both income and per capita income, in a number of more recent models of
the New Economic Geography, the mobility of workers, although increasing
agglomeration, still decreases diﬀerences of per capita income.
The basic core-periphery model (Krugman, 1991, Fujita et al., 1999), is
an example: workers of the manufacturing sector move in response to wage
diﬀerentials and, in this way, equalise their wages across regions and, at the
same time, foster agglomeration; a “migration equation” is often designed to
study the dynamic equilibrium properties of the model and workers move in
response to real wage diﬀerences. We have to notice, however, that in this
model there is a diﬀerent production factor which, in the Krugman (1991)
version, is called “peasants”; this factor produces agricultural goods and is
completely immobile across regions. Although these peasants also consume
goods (and are in this way negatively aﬀected by agglomeration in the other
23region), we believe (diﬀerently from Commander et al. (2003)), that this is
not enough to classify this model as a model with brain drain. The fact
that (1) peasants are by hypothesis not allowed to move; (2) they produce
a diﬀerent good (without any sectorial mobility of workers) and (3) that
they produce goods with constant returns to scale, makes them behave more
similarly to a factor that can be called just “land”.
More recently, Puga (1999) explicitly explored the role of labour mobil-
ity in agglomeration; in his model, agglomeration is possible both with and
without migration, depending on the transport parameters. In particular, his
paper ﬁnds that, if migration is possible, income disparities fade out, but ag-
glomeration is the outcome when transport costs are low enough; if, on the
contrary, migration is not allowed, regional income disparities persist but,
then, agglomeration is an equilibrium only for intermediate transport costs,
since for lower transport costs ﬁrms become increasingly sensitive to wage
diﬀerentials and this makes them spread again.
A diﬀerent result comes from the Footloose Entrepreneur model (Bald-
win et al., 2003, Forslid and Ottaviano, 2002), but it is built with workers’
heterogeneity as an hypothesis; in this model there exist two types of work-
ers, of which only the entrepreneurs are allowed to move in response to wage
diﬀerentials. The consequence is the possibility of agglomeration, of which
only the workers in the agglomerated region, and all the entrepreneurs, take
advantage. The footloose entrepreneur model is more similar than the Core-
Periphery to a model with brain drain; however, workers are by assumption
heterogeneous, and ordinary workers are not allowed to move. Moreover,
also labour is by deﬁnition a heterogenous factor, since only entrepreneurs
can provide the ﬁxed cost in the production function of the ﬁrms.
This paper, diﬀerently from the previous ones, does not assume any het-
erogeneity of labour (any worker can be substituted by another, or more if
needed), nor it assumes that by deﬁnition some workers are immobile. On
the contrary, without using any of the above hypotheses, we are able to show
that:
- The incentive to move is higher for workers with higher skills.
- This leads to skill biased migration ﬂows.
- If particularly skill biased, migration ﬂows can reinforce regional income
disparities, instead of being an adjustment mechanism.
246 Integrating the two mechanisms
The two mechanisms deﬁned in sections 3 and 4 are complementary, rather
than alternative, and can be easily integrated to see their joint eﬀects. The
outcome is that more complex behaviours can be observed, but still skill
biased migration ﬂows result.
As a ﬁrst and easier example, the case in which two regions are diﬀerently
endowed of ﬁxed and immobile factors and implement the same wage struc-
ture (for instance four wage layers), with the same initial skill distribution
among workers and the same individual and skill-independent variability of
mobility costs. In this case (Fig. 11) the M-function is stepwise increasing
for the workers who live in the lagging region, and stepwise decreasing for
those living in the advantaged region; if mobility between regions is allowed,
the migration ﬂows from the lagging to the already advantaged region will
therefore be biased towards the higher skilled. At the same time, another mi-
gration ﬂow, much smaller in size and biased towards the lower skilled will go
in the opposite direction. This second migration ﬂow is due to the hypothesis
that personal mobility costs are not lower bounded and can also be negative
(section 4). In this sense the M-function represents the propensity to move
as a function of skills.
If the two regions have a diﬀerent wage structure, more complex results
arise. For instance, if the advantaged region has a more compressed wage
scheme, it is possible that the incentive to move is maximum not for the
highest skilled but for other high skilled workers. The M-function, however,
remains generally increasing in the level of skills for those living in the disad-
vantaged region. Fig. 12 plots the case in which the West (advantaged region)
has 3 wage layers and the East has 4 of them. If it is possible for workers
to move, there will be a ﬂow of workers with higher than average personal
skills towards the West. There will also be a migration ﬂow in the opposite
direction, much smaller in size and with average personal skill endowment
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Figure 12: Integrating the two mechanism: regions with diﬀerent wage struc-
ture.
277 Conclusions
The traditional argument according to which migration is an adjustment
mechanism of regional income per capita disparities is here controverted.
Two features are described to explain why migration ﬂows can be skill bi-
ased. In both, assuming skills as a part of human capital, migration ﬂows
aﬀect regional capital endowment. In the ﬁrst case, migration ﬂows stem
from interregional wage diﬀerences, due to diﬀerent wage settings mecha-
nisms in the two regions; high skilled workers are so pushed to move and
get higher wages. The receiving region being the favoured one, regional dis-
parities widen instead of narrowing as a classical framework predicts. In the
second case, even if workers receive their marginal productivity, regional dis-
parities persist if region speciﬁc and unevenly distributed assets exist. In
this case, the high skilled workers will be more likely to overcome mobility
costs and therefore those that move towards the more endowed region. As
a result, the demand for skills of the richer region, is compensated by few
highly productive workers instead of many whose productivity is low or just
average. The richer region (the West) will drain from the other region the
skills needed to exploit the potential of its region speciﬁc assets. This allows
the richer region’s production to further expand at detriment of the poorer.
In addition to this, the skills borne in workers that move from one region
to the other will be incorporated in relatively few migrants but bearing on
average higher productivity than the average of the source region.
The richer region will so end with a workforce which is relatively scarce in
number (relatively to the ﬁxed factors) but endowed with an average higher
productivity. The mobility of workers, therefore, instead of decreasing re-
gional per capita income disparities, widens them. These two settings are
then uniﬁed, but the ﬁndings are substantially conﬁrmed.
Policy makers should take this argument into account in implementing cohe-
sion policies: in particular, non distortionary compensation mechanisms for
weaker regions should be thought, or actions to counteract naturally work-
ing trends should be undertaken. In particular, training policies can reveal
ineﬀective when they are not integrated with appropriate structural interven-
tion aﬀecting the complementarities of skills with other physical production
features.
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